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sensitive to the organization So, it behooves you to identify potential opportunities for HTTP response splitting in your apps Doing so is rather easy Just as most XSS vulnerabilities derive from the ability to input angle brackets (< and >) into applications, nearly all HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities we ve seen involve use of one of the two the major web script response redirect methods: JavaScript ASP responsesendRedirect
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This is not to say that all HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities are derived from these methods We have also seen nonscript-based applications that were vulnerable to HTTP response splitting (including one ISAPI-based application at a major online service), and Microsoft has issued at least one bulletin for a product that shipped with such a vulnerability (see http://wwwmicrosoftcom/technet/security/Bulletin/MS04026mspx) Therefore, don t assume your web app isn t affected until you check all the response rewriting logic Sanctum s paper covers the JavaScript example, so let s take a look at what an ASPbased HTTP response splitting vulnerability might look like You can easily find pages that use these response redirect methods by searching for the literal strings in a good Internet search engine For example: http://wwwgooglecom/search q=+%22Response Redirect The Response object is one of many intrinsic COM objects (ASP built-in objects) that are available to ASP pages, and ResponseRedirect is just one method exposed by that object Microsoft s MSDN site (http://msdnmicrosoftcom) has authoritative information on how the ResponseRedirect method works, and we won t go into broad detail here other than to provide an example of how it might be called in a typical web page Figure 11-13 shows an example we turned up after performing a simple search for ResponseRedirect on Google The basic code behind this form is rather simple:
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If RequestForm("selEngines") = "yahoo" ThenResponseRedirect("http:// searchyahoocom/bin/search p=" & RequestForm("txtSearchWords")) End If
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The error in this code may not be immediately obvious because we ve stripped out some of the surrounding code, so let s just paint it in bold colors: the form takes input from the user ("txtSearchWords") and then redirects it to the Yahoo! Search page using ResponseRedirect This is a classic candidate for cross-site input validation issues, including HTTP response splitting, so let s throw something potentially malicious
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Figure 11-13 A simple web form that uses the ResponseRedirect ASP method to send user input to another site
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at it What if we input the following text into this form (a manual line break has been added due to page-width restrictions):
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blah%0d%0aContent-Length:%200%0d%0aHTTP/11%20200%20OK%0d%0aContentType:%20text/html%0d%0aContent-Length:%2020%0d%0a<html>Hacked!</html>
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This input would get incorporated into the response redirect to the Yahoo! Search page, resulting in the following HTTP response being sent to the user s browser:
HTTP/11 302 Object moved Server: Microsoft-IIS/50 Date: Fri, 06 Aug 2004 04:35:42 GMT Location: http://searchyahoocom/bin/search p=blah%0d%0a Content-Length:%200%0d%0a HTTP/11%20200%20OK%0d%0a Content-Type:%20text/html%0d%0a Content-Length:%2020%0d%0a <html>Hacked!</html> Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Length: 121 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private <head><title>Object moved</title></head> <body><h1>Object Moved</h1>This object may be found <a HREF="">here</a></body>
We ve placed some judicious line breaks in this output to visually illustrate what happens when this response is received in the user s browser This also occurs programmatically, because each %0d%0a is interpreted by the browser as a carriage return line feed (CRLF), creating a new line Thus, the first Content-Length HTTP header ends the real server response with a zero length, and the following line beginning with HTTP/11 starts a new injected response that can be controlled by a malicious hacker We ve simply elected to display some harmless HTML here, but attackers can get much more creative with HTTP headers such as Set Cookie (identity modification), LastModified, and Cache-Control (cache poisoning) To further assist with visibility of the ultimate outcome here, we ve highlighted the entire injected server response in bold
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